Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 70
Issue 3 Issue 3 - 2017

Article 4

4-2017

Saving the Political Consensus in Favor of Free
Trade
Timothy Meyer

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the International Trade Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Timothy Meyer, Saving the Political Consensus in Favor of Free Trade, 70 Vanderbilt Law Review 985 (2017)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol70/iss3/4

This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by
an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

ESSAY
Saving the Political Consensus in
Favor of Free Trade
Timothy Meyer*
2016 was the year that the political consensus in favor of liberalized
international trade collapsed. Today, across the world, voters' belief that
internationaltrade agreements lead to economic inequality threatens to derail
ratificationof the next generationof trade agreements and undo the substantial
gains made under existing arrangements. The United States elected Donald
Trump president on a platform of rolling back or renegotiating trade
agreements. President Trump has moved to fulfill that promise immediately
upon taking office by "unsigning"the Trans-PacificPartnership("TPP), the
most recent major effort to liberalize global tradingrules, and initiatingefforts
to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA'). The
United Kingdom voted to pull out of the European Union, one of the world's
largest and most important free trade zones. Europe's top trade negotiator
declared Europeantradepolicy "close to death"after Germany and France held
up ratificationof a free trade agreement with Canada.
In the face of this onslaught, trade's defenders have run out of ideas.
They point out that trade makes nations wealthier; that trade plays a minor
role in creating economic inequality when compared with technological
innovation; and that domestic policies unconnected to trade rules can more
efficiently address economic inequality, and can do so without the need for
international obligations that might be construed as limiting national
sovereignty in matters of social policy. These views are right as a matter of
economics. But politicians make trade rules, not economists. Right or wrong,
voters' belief that liberalizing trade leads to economic inequality creates a
political constrainton trade liberalization.
This Essay proposes a way to save the political consensus in favor of
free trade. In order to preserve and extend the internationaltrade regime and
*
Professor of Law and Enterprise Scholar, Vanderbilt University Law School. Thanks to
Ganesh Sitaraman for helpful comments.
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the extraordinarygains it has produced since the end of World War II, the next
generation of preferential trade agreements should include international
obligations binding on developed countries to address domestic economic
inequality. In other words, trade agreements must include obligations to
redistribute the gains from trade within countries. This approach differs
dramaticallyfrom that taken in existing trade agreements. Since NAFTA, trade
agreements have tried to protect those who stand to lose from free tradeprincipally labor interests-by including laborprovisions in tradeagreements.
However, these provisions are outward looking. They seek to raise labor and
environmental standardsin developing countries (e.g., Mexico) in order to limit
the loss of jobs in developed countries (e.g., the United States). Critics of trade
agreements have bought into this orientation. They argue, for example, for
removing investor-state dispute settlement ("ISDS") from trade agreements. But
removing ISDS does little to help those suffering economically in developed
countries, and it hurts developed countries' businesses when they operate
overseas. The removal of ISDS thus would be a major concession to critics of
trade agreements, and yet not one that advances the core objective of ensuring
that trade agreements improve economic equality.
To be sure, governments do have domestic programs to help those
negatively impacted by liberalized trade rules. Trade adjustment assistance
("TAA") programs offer financial assistanceto those who lose theirjobs due to
internationaltrade. But recent studies in the United States suggest that TAA is
ineffective. Moreover, unlike trade agreements, which are in force indefinitely,
TAA expires every few years unless Congress reauthorizes it-a fight each time.
To put it bluntly, these approaches have failed. They have failed to
staunch the loss of jobs, and they have failed to persuade voters in developed
countries that internationaltrade is not a primarycause of economic inequality.
An "Economic Development Chapter" in future preferential trade agreements
would commit developed countries to addressingtheir own economic inequality
problems at home. An Economic Development Chapter would create
internationalobligationsfor member states to establish fiscal programs, such
as education and infrastructure spending, designed to boost economic
opportunity for those left behind by growing inequality. These spending
obligations would be indexed, so that they would rise and fall with the economic
losses attributableto trade agreements. If such losses do not occur or taper off,
nations' spending commitments would naturally sunset. These obligations
would be enforced through reporting and monitoring requirements, similar to
human rights treaties, and dispute settlement provisions that could lead to a
loss of market access, the norm in trade agreements.
Tying measures designed to address economic inequality directly into
trade agreements would createpolitical coalitions in favor of continuingefforts
to liberalize trade. Those who do not benefit from trade agreements could still
support them as a way to obtain greaterdomestic benefits. PresidentTrump, for
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instance, has made infrastructure spending a major domestic priority and
might be willing to support trade agreements in exchange. And those who
benefit most from the liberalized trade rules could support redistributionas the
price of further globalization. Trade agreements would create a commitment
device allowing those who gain from trade to commit in advance to provide those
who do not with a share of the spoils.
INTRODUCTION...............................................
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INTRODUCTION
The decadent internationalbut individualisticcapitalism, in the
hands of which we found ourselves after the War, is not a success. It is
not intelligent, it is not beautiful, it is not just, it is not virtuous-andit
doesn't deliver the goods. In short, we dislike it and we are beginning to
despise it. But when we wonder what to put in its place, we are extremely
perplexed.I
-John Maynard Keynes
2016 was the year that the political consensus in favor of
liberalized international trade collapsed. Surprisingly, the trade
regime's existential crisis has not come from developing countries, who
have long worried that liberalized trade rules disproportionately benefit
developed countries and sometimes work to the outright detriment of

1.

John Maynard Keynes, National Self-Sufficiency, 22 YALE REV. 755, 758 (1933).

988

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:3:985

developing countries. 2 Instead, the threat has come from within
developed countries. During the 2016 presidential election, a
substantial number of American voters of both major political parties
supported candidates who ran on campaigns of rolling back,
renegotiating, or revoking international trade agreements. 3 This
support culminated in the election of Donald Trump, who after taking
office immediately "unsigned" the Trans-Pacific Partnership ("TPP")
and has initiated efforts to renegotiate the North American Free Trade
Agreement ("NAFTA"). 4 British voters recently chose to withdraw from
the European Union, in large part because they objected to the free
movement of people and the regulatory harmonization that
accompanies membership in the EU's common market.5 Within
Continental Europe, countries such as Germany, France, and Belgium
have begun to get cold feet about mega-regional trade agreements,
imperiling the prospects for ratification of pending agreements, such as
the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement ("CETA") with
Canada, and undermining European support for negotiating future
agreements, such as the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership ("TTIP") with the United States.6
Economic inequality is the engine driving this transnational
dissent movement forward. From Detroit to Liverpool, large swaths of
the population perceive themselves to lose out from globalization.
Economic data has started to validate these beliefs. In the United
States, ninety-five percent of the economic gains during the recovery
from the financial crisis of 2007 have gone to the richest one percent of

2.

See, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITz, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2003) (critiquing

the 'Washington Consensus" policy of free markets as implemented by international economic
institutions as bad for developing countries).
3.
See infra Part I.B.
4.
See Eric Bradner, Trump to Begin Renegotiating NAFTA with Leaders of Mexico,
Canada, CNN (Jan. 22, 2017, 11:58 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/22/politics/trumprenegotiate-naftal [https://perma.cc/TMZ6-8K4M].
5.
Lord Ashcroft, How the United Kingdom Voted on Thursday ...
and Why, LORD
ASHCROFT POLLS (June 24, 2016), http://lordashcroftpolls.com/2016/06/how-the-united-kingdomvoted-and-why/ [https://perma.cc/3FGL-DBAE] (finding that the most popular reason voters gave
for voting to exit from the EU was because decisions about the UK should be made in the UK).
6.
See, e.g., Hans von der Burchard & Alberto Mucci, EU Trade Policy 'Close to Death' if
Canada Deal Fails, POLITICO (Aug. 11, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://www.politico.eu/article/eu-tradepolicy-close-to-death-if-canada-deal-fails/ [https://perma.cc/USD4-E3VA] (quoting the EU's top
trade official as saying the EU's trade policy is "close to death" after France and Germany insisted
that the EU-Canadian free trade agreement could not be ratified without the consent of thirtyeight national and regional parliaments); Growing Protest Against TTIP and CETA Trade
Agreements in Germany, DW (Aug. 23, 2016), http://www.dw.com/en/growing-protest-against-ttipand-ceta-trade-agreements-in-germany/a-19496077 [https://perma.cc/5ZME-TWTW].
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society. 7 More to the point, studies have begun to find that, lo and
behold, the loss of large numbers of manufacturing jobs can be
attributed directly to the expansion of free trade in the early twentyfirst century.8
In both legal and policymaking circles, the reaction to the link
between globalization and domestic inequality has been a mix of
disbelief and bemusement. Over and over again, the trade regime's
defenders note that globalization increases the welfare of nations, that
technology plays a more important role in economic disruption than
trade, and that domestic policies offer the most efficient way to
distribute the gains from trade within nations. 9
As an economic matter, these views are surely correct. The
international trade regime has led to extraordinary gains in both
economic and more general human welfare terms. I therefore would not
describe the international trade regime put in place after the Second
World War in the terms in which Keynes described the regime that
followed the First World War in the quote that opens this Essay. But as
Keynes suggested over eighty years ago, the trade regime's ongoing
viability depends on politics, not economics. Voters in the United States
and Europe increasingly blame international trade for growing
economic inequality. That linkage alone is enough to make economic

Growing Apart, ECONOMIST (Sept. 21, 2013), http://www.economist.cominews/leaders/
7.
21586578-americas-income-inequality-growing-again-time-cut-subsidies-rich-and-invest
[https://perma.cc/9PDL-KV5S].
8.
See David H. Autor, David Dorn & Gordon H. Hanson, The China Syndrome: Local Labor
Market Effects of Import Competition in the United States, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 2121, 2125 (2013)
("We find that local labor markets that are exposed to rising low-income-country imports due to
China's rising competitiveness experience increased unemployment, decreased labor-force
participation, and increased use of disability and other transfer benefits, as well as lower wages.");
Justin R. Pierce & Peter K. Schott, The Surprisingly Swift Decline of U.S. Manufacturing
Employment, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 1632 (2016) (linking a drop in U.S. manufacturing jobs after
2000 to limitations on increasing tariffs against Chinese goods, with industries more exposed to
the policy change suffering greater declines in employment); see also Peter Gosselin & Mike
Dorning, After Doubts, Economists Find China Kills U.S. Factory Jobs, BLOOMBERG POL. (June
18, 2015, 6:10 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2015-06-18/after-doubtingeconomists-find-china-killing-u-s-factory-jobs [https://perma.cc/26MH-LPYA] (discussing several
recent studies documenting a direct link between China's accession to the World Trade
Organization in 2001 and the loss of millions of manufacturing jobs).
9.

See, e.g., PAUL R. KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY

AND POLICY 221 (7th ed. 2005):
It is always preferable to deal with market failures as directly as possible .... Any
proposed trade policy should always be compared with a purely domestic policy aimed
at correcting the same problem. If the domestic policy appears too costly or has
undesirable side effects, the trade policy is almost surely even less desirable .... ;
Simon Lester, The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy by
Dani Rodrik, 10 WORLD TRADE REV. 409, 414 (2011) (book review) ("But query whether trade
restrictions are really the best approach . . . to protect domestic labor standards[ ].").
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inequality a major object of concern for proponents of international
trade.
This Essay argues that in order to preserve and extend the
international trade regime, and the extraordinary gains it has produced
since the end of World War II in terms of both economic growth and
human welfare, the next generation of trade agreements must include
binding international obligations on developed countries to address
economic inequality. In other words, trade agreements must include
obligations to redistribute the gains from trade within countries. Since
NAFTA, trade agreements have tried to protect those who stand to lose
from international trade-principally labor interests-by including
labor (and environmental) provisions. However, these provisions are
outward looking. They seek to raise labor and environmental standards
in developing countries (e.g., Mexico), both as an inherent good and to
limit the loss of jobs in developed countries (e.g., the United States).
Critics of trade agreements have bought into this orientation. They
argue for removing investor-state dispute settlement ("ISDS") from
trade agreements. But removing ISDS does little to help those suffering
economically in developed countries, and it hurts developed countries'
businesses when they operate overseas. The removal of ISDS thus
would be a major concession to critics of trade agreements, and yet not
one that advances the core objective of ensuring that trade agreements
improve economic equality.
To be sure, governments do have domestic programs to help
those negatively impacted by liberalized trade rules. Trade adjustment
assistance ("TAA") programs offer financial assistance to those who lose
their jobs due to international trade. But recent studies in the United
States suggest that TAA is ineffective. Moreover, unlike trade
agreements, which are in force indefinitely, TAA expires every few
years unless Congress reauthorizes it-a fight each time.
To put it bluntly, these provisions have failed. They have failed
to staunch the loss of jobs, and they have failed to persuade voters in
developed countries that international trade is not a primary cause of
economic inequality. Saving liberalized trade thus requires new
solutions.
International trade agreements should henceforth include an
"Economic Development Chapter" that contains three kinds of
obligations: (1) member states would be required to report to an
Economic Development Committee-a body of experts elected by the
member states but serving in their individual capacities-two kinds of
data. First, they would be required to measure the gains from trade to
the country as a whole and how those gains are distributed across the
country. Such data would thus include measures of which communities
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or regions benefit from trade and which suffer. Second, member states
would be required to report the measures they have taken to
redistribute domestically the gains from trade; (2) member states would
be required to enact substantive policies to redistribute the gains from
trade domestically. Governments require flexibility in the specific kinds
of programs on which they spend. Flexibility is necessary because
individual nations will have individual needs, and because flexibility
enables political bargaining around the design of programs, which can
facilitate the building of coalitions in support of both trade agreements
and economic development policies. For this reason, the obligation
should be expressed as a fiscal obligation to expend a certain amount of
money on policies aimed at redistributing the gains from the trade. The
amount members would be required to expend would be indexed to
losses from liberalized trade that a government identifies and reports
to the Economic Development Committee. Trade agreements would
therefore commit domestic legislatures like the U.S. Congress to fund
policies of their choosing that address the downsides of liberalized
trade. The Economic Development Chapter should also push states to
spend in areas that boost economic opportunity, such as educational
and infrastructure spending; (3) failure to comply with either the
monitoring and reporting obligations or trade-adjustment obligations
would be subject to inter-state dispute settlement and could lead to the
suspension of trade concessions.
A robust Economic Development Chapter is in the interest of
both developed and developing countries, as well as free trade
supporters and opponents within those countries. In developed
countries, concerns about economic inequality have led to the United
States' decision not to ratify the TPP, influenced the United Kingdom's
decision to leave the EU, and have threatened to derail ratification of
CETA in the EU and the negotiation of the TTIP between the EU and
the United States. Tying measures designed to address economic
inequality directly into trade agreements would create political
coalitions in favor of liberalized trade. Those who do not benefit from
trade agreements could still support them as a way to obtain greater
domestic benefits. President Trump, for instance, has made
infrastructure spending a major domestic priority and might be willing
to support trade agreements in exchange. And those who benefit most
from liberalized trade rules could support redistribution as the price of
further globalization. Trade agreements would create a commitment
device allowing those who gain from trade to commit in advance to
provide those who do not with a share of the spoils.
For developing countries, the inclusion of these provisions would
reduce the likelihood that developed countries will seek to renegotiate
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trade agreements, either immediately prior to ratification or years
down the road. Before the United States could ratify NAFTA in 1993,
the United States first had to seek additional concessions on labor and
environmental provisions from Mexico and Canada. 10 President Trump
intends to renegotiate NAFTA again as part of his strategy to bring jobs
back to the United States. Meanwhile, the UK must now renegotiate
the terms of its access to the EU common market. These renegotiations
inject uncertainty into trade politics, markets, and the lives of ordinary
citizens. By reducing renegotiation, Economic Development Chapters
would introduce a needed measure of stability into trade policy.
Part I describes the debate about the role of free trade in
creating economic inequality. In short, proponents of liberalized trade
continue to argue that trade policy and domestic policies to address
economic inequality should be kept separate. The political consensus
that supports trade agreements is falling through the cracks of that
separation. Part II discusses policies that governments have used to
address economic inequality: labor and environmental provisions in
trade agreements and trade adjustment assistance programs
domestically. Part III outlines what an Economic Development Chapter
might look like.
I. THE POLITICAL CONSENSUS IN FAVOR OF LIBERALIZING TRADE

A. DebatingInternationalTrade
The traditional view among economists has been that liberalized
international trade is a rising tide that lifts all boats. As Gregory
Mankiw, a Harvard economist and adviser to President George W.
Bush, put it: "Economists have talked for years about trade, free
international trade, being a positive for economies around the world,
both at home and abroad. This is something that is universally believed
by economists.""
The logic of this proposition rests on the notion of comparative
advantage. School children learn that specialization of labor drove the
evolution of ancient civilizations. In the days of hunter-gatherers,
individuals or family groups had to do everything to survive-find food,
make tools and clothing, and build shelters. Someone who had to
10. Although formally the United States sought concessions from both Mexico and Canada,
the labor and environmental provisions in the NAIFTA Side Agreements were aimed principally at
Mexico. The United States already had a free trade agreement in place with Canada. Free Trade
Agreement, Can.-U.S., Jan. 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 281.
11. N. Gregory Mankiw & Phillip Swagel, The Politics and Economics of Offshore
Outsourcing, 53 J. MONETARY ECON. 1027, 1031 (2006).
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construct a shelter for his family, make a spear to hunt with, hunt, cook,
and turn animal skins into clothing probably was not going to do a great
job at any of these things. Hunter-gatherers were jacks of all trades but
masters of none. Specialization of labor allowed people to concentrate
on only one task-farming or weaving or toolmaking. Freed from the
need to do everything, a blacksmith could learn to build better tools and
trade those tools for food. The farmer could grow more food because he
no longer needed to spend time making a plough. He could outsource
the job to the blacksmith.
Comparative advantage is the same basic idea applied to
international trade. Countries do better when they concentrate on
producing those things that they are relatively better at making and
trade for everything else. 12 The intuition behind this idea is that
countries have finite resources (labor, natural resources) with which to
produce goods. They also vary in how efficiently they can produce a
particular good. Countries can trade those goods they produce relatively
efficiently for those goods they produce relatively inefficiently. The cost
of buying the relatively inefficiently produced good from another
country is less than the opportunity cost of diverting scarce resources
to produce the same good at home.13 As the leading international trade
law casebook puts it, the "general lesson of comparative advantage is
that when two countries open up to trade, both are made better off in
the sense that the total wealth of the countries is increased."14
The fact that international trade increases the wealth of nations
has long been the cornerstone of the defense of liberalized trade.
Economists, lawyers, and policymakers have argued that countries
should lock in the gains from liberalized trade through international
institutions like the World Trade Organization ("WTO") and leave the
division of those gains within countries to domestic policy. 15 In economic
terms, international trade creates Kaldor-Hicks gains-it boosts total
global welfare, but in a way that may leave some worse off. 16 In

12.

For a basic presentation of the idea of comparative advantage, see JOOST H.B.

PAUWELYN, ANDREW T. GUZMAN & JENNIFER A. HILLMAN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 12-16 (3d

ed. 2016).
13. For a more advanced presentation of the notion of comparative advantage, see KRUGMAN
14.

PAUWELYN, GUZMAN & HILLMAN, supra note 12, at 16.

15.

See e.g., KRUGMAN & OBSTFELD, supra note 9, at 214-17; PAUWELYN, GUZMAN

&

& OBSTFELD, supra note 9.

HILLMAN, supranote 12, at 25 ("[O]ne might support liberalization if one believes that the trading
system is an inappropriate way to redistribute the gains from trade.").
16. See Meredith Kolsky Lewis, WTO Winners and Losers: The Trade and Development
Disconnect, 39 GEO. J. INT'L L. 165, 167 (2007) (arguing that "the Kaldor-Hicks framework provides
a conceptual basis that the [WTO] membership could adopt to harmonize its trade and
development goals").
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principle, Kaldor-Hicks improvements in welfare can be transformed
into Pareto improvements, or improvements that increase total welfare
by making at least one party better off without making any party worse
off, through transfers. Neither the fact of liberalized trade nor trade law
guarantees those transfers will actually take place, however.
Yet the average citizen cares mostly about this second issue:
How are the gains from trade distributed? Indeed, economists
themselves noted as early as 1941 that international trade can leave
some, especially less-skilled workers, worse off.17 If trade is efficient in

the sense that it creates the largest pie for policymakers to divide
among their citizens, but it does so in a way that exacerbates inequality,
should the average citizen still favor free trade?
In general, economists have argued that the answer is yes. They
have had faith, for example, that labor markets would adjust to the
effects of international trade, smoothing out some of the short-run costs
of liberalized trade. Former Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke
has argued that
some empirical research suggests that, in the 1980s and 1990s, increased international
trade reduced the profitability and hence the demand for labor in a number of industries
that employed relatively more low-skilled workers. . . . Because labor markets are
adaptable, outsourcing abroad does not ultimately affect aggregate employment, but it
may affect the distribution of wages. 18

Other economists were even more optimistic. Jagdish Bhagwati, an
economist at Columbia University, argued in 2007 that econometric
research showed that international trade did not put downward
pressure on wages and indeed might even protect wages from the
downward pressures created by technological change. 19 In other words,
liberalizing trade did not create the need for domestic redistribution.
The invisible hand of the market would adjust.
This is not to say that Bhagwati or Bernanke do not recognize
growing inequality. They do. 2 0 But they finger a different culprit:
technological change. 2 1 Liberalizing trade and technological innovation

17. Paul Krugman, Trade and Inequality, Revisited, VOX (June 15, 2007), http://voxeu.org/
article/trade-and-inequality-revisited [https:/perma.cclRAB9-MK47] ("[Slince the 1941 StolperSamuelson paper, we've known that growing trade can have large effects on income distribution,
and can easily leave broad groups, such as less-skilled workers, worse off.").
18. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Speech to the Greater Omaha Chamber of
Commerce: The Level and Distribution of Economic Well-Being (Feb. 6, 2007), https://www
.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speechlbernanke2007O2O6a.htm [https://perma.cc/3NYQ-BXEC].
19. Jagdish Bhagwati, Technology, Not Globalisation,Drives Wages Down, FIN. TIMES (Jan.
3, 2007), https://www.ft.com/content/f8738fba-9b53-1ldb-aa7O-0000779e2340 [https://perma.cc/
ZSN6-U5K9].
20. See Bernanke, supranote 18; Bhagwati, supranote 19.
21. Bernanke, supra note 18.
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have, as it turns out, basically the same effects. The rise of email has
rendered the U.S. Postal Service increasingly irrelevant. Why do we
need to employ people to sort, transport, and deliver mail when we can
just send messages through the internet? Self-checkout technology at
grocery stores reduces the need to pay clerks to do the same job. And so
forth. Just as producing a product overseas creates job losses at home,
so too technological innovation eliminates jobs. Indeed, technological
innovation displaces more people than trade. 22 As Bernanke said, "I
read the available evidence as favoring the view that the influence of
globalization on inequality has been moderate and almost surely less
important than the effects of skill-biased technological change." 23
Yet a growing number of studies have begun to link the loss of
hundreds of thousands or millions of manufacturing jobs not to
technology, but to competition from imports created by the
liberalization of trade rules, especially with China. 24 In light of this
data, some scholars have begun swimming against the current of
traditional thinking. For the most part, these writers favor liberalized
trade and support the international institutions that make such trade
possible. They worry, though, that the trade regime may prompt a
backlash if it does not offer governments a way to address the most
pressing domestic policy issues of the twenty-first century.
Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz has been at the
forefront of those questioning the distributional effects of globalization.
He has taken trade's cheerleaders to task, writing that "one could say
[they] lied [by arguing] that all would benefit" from free trade. 25
Instead, he reviews data on wage stagnation in the United States and
Europe, concluding that "the big losers [in recent decades]-those who
gained little or nothing-were those at the bottom and the middle and
the working classes in the advanced countries. Globalization is not the
only reason, but it is one of the reasons." 26

22. See Michael J. Hicks, Donald, Hillary, and Bernie Are Lying to Us About Those Lost
Manufacturing Jobs, MARKETWATCH (May 14, 2016, 12:50 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/
story/donald-hillary-and-bernie-are-lying-to-us-about-those-lost-manufacturing-jobs-2016-05-12
[https://perma.ccH29R-SCKB] ("Somewhere between 81% and 100% of those 7.5 million
manufacturing job losses since the 1970s are due to technology, not trade.").
23. Bernanke, supra note 18; see also Bhagwati, supranote 19 ("The culprit is not globisation
but labour-saving technical change that puts pressure on the wages of the unskilled.").
24. See Autor, Dorn & Hanson, supra note 8; Pierce & Schott, supra note 8.
25. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and Its New Discontents, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Aug. 5,
2016), https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/globalization-new-discontents-by-joseph-e-stiglitz-2016-08 [https://perma.ccNAZ7-JQVC].
Id. (discussing BRANKO MILANOVIC, GLOBAL INEQUALITY: A NEW APPROACH FOR THE AGE
26.
OF GLOBALIZATION (2016)).
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Dani Rodrik, an economist at Harvard, has gone further,
arguing that trade agreements need to create greater "policy space" for
governments to pursue domestic policy objectives. 27 He argues that a
new consensus has set in in which economists agree that globalization
is indeed contributing to inequality, even if commentators disagree
about its relative importance. 28 More importantly, Rodrik finds that
anti-globalization forces are motivated "only partly by labor market
concerns and pocket-book issues." 29 They are also motivated by notions
of fairness. 30 A global economy that delivers benefits to some but not
others strikes many people as fundamentally unfair. That unfairnessdifficult to quantify economically-is the international trade regime's
Achilles' Heel.
Despite the emerging doubts about whether liberalizing trade is
good, or just good for many but not all, unabashed free trade continues
to have its defenders. The critics' critics have responded by falling back
on traditional economic thinking. Joel Trachtman, a respected
international lawyer and professor, has recently argued that the
suggestion that liberalized trade causes economic stagnation and
inequality is "without foundation." 31 Similarly, Simon Lester has
argued that limitations on liberalized trade are not the best, or even an
effective, means of dealing with domestic policy issues such as labor
standards. 32 Economists David Dollar and Aart Kray have argued that
"it simply cannot be said that inequality necessarily rises with more
trade, more foreign investment, and lower tariffs." 33
Trade's defenders do not necessarily think that domestic policies
aimed at addressing inequality are a bad idea. Like most people, free
traders have diverse views on redistributive policies. What they agree
on, though, is that those policies should be kept separate from trade

27.

See, e.g., DANI RODRIK, THE GLOBALIZATION PARADOX: DEMOCRACY AND THE FUTURE OF

THE WORLD ECONOMY (2012); Dani Rodrik, How to Save Globalizationfrom Its Cheerleaders, 1 J.
INT'L TRADE & DIPL. 1 (2007) [hereinafter Rodrik, How to Save Globalization].
28. Rodrik, How to Save Globalization, supranote 27, at 9. Indeed, as Nobel Prize-winning
economist Paul Krugman argued as far back as 2007: "It's no longer safe to assert that trade's
impact on the income distribution in wealthy countries is fairly minor. There's a good case that it
is big, and getting bigger." Krugman, supra note 17.
29. Rodrik, How to Save Globalization,supra note 27, at 21.
30. Id.
31. Joel Trachtman, The Anti-Globalists, INT'L ECON. L. & POL'Y BLOG (Aug. 18, 2016),
http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com [https://perma.ce/4XRF-HTZD].
32. Lester, supra note 9.
33. David Dollar & Aart Kraay, Spreading the Wealth, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2002, at 120,
128.
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rules. 34 Trade makes the pie bigger; domestic policies divide the pie up.
Never the twain shall meet.
B. The Domestic PoliticalEconomy of Trade
The traditional economic thinking and its response to critics
largely miss the point. No one doubts that liberalized trade does in fact
create economic losers within countries.3 5 The argument is about the
magnitude of the effect and its relative importance as compared to other
causes of inequality such as technological innovation-an interesting
and important question for economic policy.36 Likewise, no one disputes
that domestic policies, such as a more progressive tax system or robust
social safety nets, can in principle address economic inequality without
limiting the economic integration envisioned by the WTO and, to an
even greater extent, mega-regional trade agreements like the TPP and
TTIP.3 7
But implementing domestic policies requires a domestic political
consensus in their favor. Unlike scholarly consensus, political
consensus does not usually rest on nuanced understandings of causal
relationships and the magnitude of effects. Put simply, voters in
developed countries around the world think that liberalized trade and
the institutions that support it significantly contribute to economic
inequality. And more and more they are willing to vote accordingly.
In the United States, a recent Bloomberg poll proclaimed that
opposition to free trade is the one thing on which the Democratic and
Republican parties can agree. 38 The poll asked respondents about their
views on a number of protectionist policies. Two-thirds of respondents
said that they preferred an American-owned factory in the United

34. For example, Gabrielle Marceau, a counselor in the WTO's Legal Affairs Division and an
international law professor, has suggested that the trade regime should pursue greater
"inclusiveness," which includes "domestic policies to ensure that the benefits of trade are widely
distributed. [But flor most WTO Members, [such policies] would constitute interference in
domestic affairs, and we all agree that social choices between cultures are very difficult, if not
impossible, to compare!" Gabrielle Marceau, Towards Inclusive Growth Through Trade and
Investment, 33 SIEL NEWSL. (Soc'y of Int'l Econ. Law), Oct. 2016, at 2, 2, http://sielnet.org/
resources/Pictures/SIEL%2033rd%2ONewsletter%2OFinal.pdfl [https://perma.cc/89L2-J6JP].
35. See, e.g., Krugman, supra note 17.
36. See, e.g., Bernanke, supra note 18.
37. Many do, of course, argue that using a progressive tax system or creating a greater social
safety net would be bad policy. But they do not argue that such policies would prevent trade
agreements from going forward and having their desired effect.
38. John McCormick & Terrence Dopp, Free Trade Opposition Unites Political Parties in
Bloomberg Poll, BLOOMBERG POL. (Mar. 24, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/
articles/2016-03-24/free-trade-opposition-unites-political-parties-in-bloomberg-poll
[https://perma.cc/F38J-33DQ].
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States that created only one thousand jobs to a Chinese-owned factory
that created two thousand jobs. 39 Eighty-two percent of respondents
said they would be willing to pay more for American-produced goodS 40
a privilege they would have in a world with less liberalized trading
rules. And forty-four percent said that NAFTA had been bad for the
U.S. economy, against only twenty-nine percent who said it had been
positive.4 1 This discontent has driven presidential politics. In the
Democratic primary, Senator Bernie Sanders campaigned against trade
agreements, forcing his opponent and the eventual Democratic
nominee, Hillary Clinton, to come out against the TPP despite her
support for it as Secretary of State. Perhaps most strikingly, sixty-seven
percent of those who supported the Republican presidential nominee,
Donald Trump-and fifty-two percent of Republicans overall-have
negative views of free trade. 42 These numbers are striking because
Republicans have traditionally been the party of free trade in the
United States. Donald Trump's nomination and election represents a
rejection of these historic views.
Of course, these sentiments are not limited to the United States.
In June 2016, fifty-two percent of British voters elected to leave the
European Union, the world's largest customs union. 43 Post-referendum
polling revealed that those voting to leave did so in protest of the loss of
national control that accompanies governance by international
economic institutions. For example, forty-seven percent of respondents
said that the United Kingdom would fare better economically if it left
the EU. 4 4 Forty-nine percent of Leave voters said they voted as they did
primarily because regulations affecting Britain should be written in

39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. Polls that ask more generally about views on free trade, rather than about specific
policies, tend to find greater support for free trade. See Max Ehrenfreund, What Americans Really
Think About Free Trade, WASH. POST (Mar. 25, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
wonk/wp/2016/03/25/what-americans-really-think-about-free-trade/?utmterm=.932f867027e3
[https://perma.cc/E6ZC-SXJ9] (comparing polls and discussing Americans' contradicting opinions
on free trade); Justin McCarthy, Majority in U.S. Still See Opportunity in Foreign Trade, GALLUP
(Mar.
9, 2015),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/181886/majority-opportunity-foreign-trade.aspx
[https://perma.cc/4F74-BW5F] (discussing increased optimism of free trade amongst Americans).
42.
Bruce Stokes, Republicans, Especially Trump Supporters, See Free Trade Deals as Bad
for U.S., PEW RES. CTR.: FAcTTANK (Mar. 31, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2016/03/31/republicans-especially-trump-supporters-see-free-trade-deals-as-bad-for-u-s/
[https://perma.cc/7AZ4-D9V3].
43. Alex Hunt & Brian Wheeler, Brexit: All You Need to Know About the UK Leaving the EU,
BBC NEWS (Dec. 12, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32810887 [https://perma.cc/
WS2E-4HC4].
44. Ashcroft, supranote 5. However, only six percent of Leave voters said they voted to leave
primarily because doing so would make the UK better off economically. Id.
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vote against the regulatory
Britain rather than Brussels 45-a
harmonization at the root of the push toward preferential trade
agreements among developed countries. 46 Another thirty-three percent
voted as they did to regain control of British borders. 47 Free movement
of people and free movement of goods are foundations of the EU.
Moreover, free movement of goods implies some efforts at harmonizing
regulations, efforts made in virtually every trade agreement. 48 A prosovereignty vote might thus be viewed as a soft anti-trade vote.
Economic inequality and opportunity also played a significant role. A
majority of those employed and with university degrees voted to
remain; a majority of those unemployed and of those whose education
ended at secondary school or before voted to leave. 49
Although the precise breakdown may vary, today this skepticism
of the value of economic and political integration runs throughout
European politics. Philip Cordery, the French Parliament member
responsible for European affairs in President Francois Hollande's
party, has stated his belief that "what happened in the UK at the
referendum could have happened [in] almost every other country in the
European Union-except in the other countries no Prime Minister
would have been as irresponsible as to ask for a referendum."5 0 A 2016
survey from the University of Edinburgh found that a majority of
French voters and pluralities of voters in Germany, Spain, and Sweden

45. Id.
46. See, e.g., Peter A. Petri & Michael G. Plummer, The Economic Effects of the Trans-Pacific
Partnership:New Estimates 15 (Peterson Inst. for Int'l Econ., Working Paper No. 16-2, 2016),
https://piie.com/system/files/documents/wpl6-2-0.pdf [https://perma.cc/22VQ-T8L2] (noting that
the U.S. gains from the TPP flow primarily from the reduction in nontariff barriers such as
regulatory obstacles).
47. Ashcroft, supra note 5.
See, e.g., Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement Between Canada and the
48.
European Union and its Member States ch. 21 (Sept. 26, 2014), http://trade.ec.europa.euldoclib/
CETA];
[hereinafter
[https://perma.cc/E9Z9-NC7S]
docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S.
154 [hereinafter WTO Agreement]; Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, , 1867 U.N.T.S.
187, 190 (1994) [hereinafter Results of the Uruguay Round] (creating obligations for states to work
toward harmonizing technical regulations); Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures art. 3, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493 (1994) [hereinafter SPS Agreement] (creating
a presumption that measures comply with the SPS Agreement if they reflect international
standards).
49. Ashcroft, supra note 5.
'Almost All EU States Could Follow UK, Leave Union'-French MP, RT NEWS (Sept. 27,
50.
2016, 7:11 AM), https://www.rt.com/news/360762-french-mp-eu-members-exit/ [https://perma.cc/
W796-TXXR].
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favored a referendum on leaving the EU.51 Surveys have found similar
support for exit, or at least the opportunity to vote on exit, in the
Netherlands, Austria, Italy, and Hungary. 52 Beyond a threat to the EU
itself, disaffected European constituencies are increasingly agitating
for greater concessions in trade agreements. In October 2016, for
instance, the regional parliament of Wallonia-the poorest region in
Belgium, with unemployment twice as high as elsewhere in the
country-temporarily blocked the Belgian government's (and therefore
effectively the entire EU's) ability to sign the CETA with Canada,
relying on features of the Belgian federal structure that give regional
parliaments a say in foreign affairs. 53
These voters may very well be mistaken about the relationship
between trade and inequality. At the very least, blowing up trade
relationships-the solution their leaders, such as President Trump in
the United States and British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson in the
UK, offer-only makes the problem worse, as British voters are
learning in the wake of the Brexit vote. And yet ultimately the longterm sustainability of the international trade regime depends on
convincing these voters that liberalized trade is in their interest.
Economic and legal policy debates are failing in this task. If economic
policy cannot create the political consensus necessary to sustain
liberalized trade, the trade regime's proponents must look to political
economy. If voters do not want liberalized trade itself, despite its many
benefits, what can international trade offer them?
II. EFFORTS TO COPE WITH TRADE-BASED INEQUALITY
The drafters of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT"), negotiated in 1947, understood that liberalizing trade was at
least as much about politics as economics. The GATT includes a number
of rules that economists agree make little sense from an economic

51. Jan Eichhorn, Christine Hdibner & Daniel Kenealy, The View from the Continent: What
People in Other Member States Think About the UK's EU Referendum, U. EDINBURG APPLIED
QUANTITATIVE

METHODS

NETWORK

(2016),

https://www.aqmen.ac.uk/sites/default/files/

TheViewFromTheContinentREPORT.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q5CR-AD87].
52. Auxit, Frexit, Nexit? EU Countries May Hold Referendums Following 'Brexit' Vote, RT
NEWS (June 23, 2016, 8:52 PM) https://www.rt.com/viral/348039-brexit-eu-referendum-domino/
[https://perma.cc/2PED-LRZ6].
53.
Barrie McKenna, What's Wallonia's Deal?A Primeron Its Role in CETA's Crisis, GLOBE
& MAIL (Oct. 25, 2016, 1:47 PM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/
international-business/european-business/explainer-ceta-wallonia-europe-andcanada/article32489554/ [https://perma.cc/62GC-PW9S] (noting that Wallonia was able to de facto
block Belgium's ability to sign CETA and that the rest of the EU had indicated it would only go
forward if its twenty-eight members were unanimous).
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perspective, but can be justified by the politics of trade. For example,
the GATT contains a number of rules on so-called "trade remedies." 54
Trade remedies essentially allow governments to use trade policy to
protect their own domestic producers by raising the tariffs on imports,
thereby increasing the price their own citizens have to pay for goods. If
a Chinese producer decides to sell its goods in the United States at less
than "normal" value, the United States can impose anti-dumping
duties-additional import duties on foreign products that ultimately
increase the cost American consumers pay for goods.5 5 Similarly, if a
sudden increase in imports injures a domestic industry, governments
can impose safeguards in the form of increased tariffs or other forms of
import restrictions. 56 Safeguards do not require a showing that a
foreign producer or foreign country has behaved illegally or unfairly.
They are purely designed to protect domestic producers that are
struggling to compete in the domestic market with foreign producers.
As a matter of economics, trade remedies (like other forms of
protectionism) effect a transfer of wealth from domestic consumers to
domestic producers. Consumers pay higher prices so that producers can
remain competitive and profitable. Moreover, trade remedies often
reduce overall welfare. For instance, the George W. Bush
administration imposed safeguards, in the form of increased tariffs, on
steel imports in 2002 to protect American steel workers. One study

See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. VI, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
54.
[hereinafter GATT] (discussing anti-dumping regulations). The WTO's creators developed these
rules in several of the WTO agreements. See Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Results
of the Uruguay Round 147, https://www.wto.org/english/does elegal-e/19-adp.pdf [https://perma
.cc/M7CZ-98GV] [hereinafter Anti-Dumping Agreement] (discussing the implementation of the
anti-dumping measures); Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Results of the
Uruguay Round 231, https://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/egaLe/24-scm.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9Z5K-GQY5] (discussing prohibited subsidies).
55. See GATT, supra note 54, art. VI (explaining that "dumping, by which products of one
country are introduced into the commerce of another country at less than the normal value of the
products, is to be condemned if it causes or threatens material injury to an established industry");
Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra note 54 (stating that anti-dumping measures are applied "under
the circumstances provided for in Article VI of GATT 1994").
56. GATT, supra note 54, art. XIX.1(a):
If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obligations incurred
by a contracting party under this Agreement, including tariff concessions, any product
is being imported into the territory of that contracting party in such increased
quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic
producers in that territory of like or directly competitive products, the contracting party
shall be free, in respect of such product, and to the extent and for such time as may be
necessary to prevent or remedy such injury, to suspend the obligation in whole or in
part or to withdraw or modify the concession.
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estimated that these tariffs cost $400,000 per job saved.57 Further,
while steel workers' jobs were saved, the tariffs actually cost the
economy jobs overall because higher steel prices forced layoffs in
downstream sectors of the economy.5 8
If trade remedies do not make sense economically, why do they
exist? As Alan Sykes has argued in the context of safeguards, trade
remedies create a political safety valve.5 9 Domestic producers, such as
the steel industry, tend to be more politically influential than
consumers, in large part because they are better organized. Domestic
producers hurt by liberalized trade create pressure on politicians to
walk back or avoid trade agreements. As a result, the overall benefits
of liberalized trade-which outweigh the costs to injured producerscould be lost. Trade remedies offer a solution to this problem.
Governments can protect politically important producers injured by
foreign competition within a larger legal framework that requires
governments to open up their markets. This compromise is clearly
second-best from an economic perspective, but the best available
solution once one considers the political constraints. 60 Better some
protectionism within the GATT than no GATT at all.
Rules on trade remedies may have been among the first efforts
to offer a measure of protectionism as the price of trade liberalization,

but they have hardly been the last. Import-competing interests have
continued to seek assurances that further trade liberalization will not
hurt them. These assurances have taken two forms. First, trade
agreements now regularly include provisions on labor standards and
environmental protection. Second, as a matter of domestic law,
governments offer displaced workers trade adjustment assistance.
A. Labor and Environment Chapters
NAFTA, negotiated in the early 1990s, provided the blueprint
for how labor and environmental issues would be addressed in modern
trade agreements. President George H.W. Bush had negotiated
NAFTA, but the 1992 presidential election, in which then-Arkansas
Governor Bill Clinton defeated Bush, threw NAFTA's fate up in the air.
In the wake of the election, members of Congress from both parties
Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Ben Goodrich, Steel Policy: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, in
&

57.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY 24, 25 (Philip King

Sharmila King eds., 4th ed. 2005).
58. Id.
59. Alan 0. Sykes, Protectionism as a "Safeguard"*A PositiveAnalysis of the GATT "Escape
Clause" with Normative Speculations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 273 (1991).
60. Id. at 259.
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responded to pressure from labor and environmental groups hoping to
defeat the agreement. 6 1 NAFTA's "opponents' strategy [was] to portray
the NAFTA as leading to a massive loss of jobs, the de-industrialization
of the U.S., and a lowering of labor and environmental standards to
those of the Third World." 6 2 In effect, critics argued that NAFTA would
force the United States to choose between losing jobs to Mexico and
lowering its own labor and environmental standards to those prevailing
in Mexico.
To assuage these concerns, President Clinton negotiated what is
known as the NAFTA Side Agreements (or more formally, the North
American Agreements on Environmental and Labor Cooperation). 63
Essentially, the NAFTA Side Agreements required the NAFTA parties
to enforce their existing labor and environmental laws. 64 They also

established consultative processes for labor and employment issues and
permitted dispute resolution that could result in monetary fines if a
country failed "to effectively enforce its occupational safety and health,
child labor or minimum wage technical standards."6 5 Most labor rights,
however, including the freedom of association, the right to strike, and
collective bargaining, were limited to consultative review and
ministerial oversight.66 With these agreements in hand, Congress
agreed to pass legislation implementing NAFTA.
Following NAFTA, labor and environmental chapters became
standard not only in U.S. trade agreements, but trade agreements

61. Douglas Seay & Wesley Smith, Why the Governors Support the NAFTA (and Washington
Doesn't), HERITAGE FOUND. (June 15, 1993), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/1993/06/
bg946nbsp-why-the-governors-support-the-nafta [https://perma.cclU76B-BCGB].
62.

Id.

63. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, opened for signature Sept.
8, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 [hereinafter NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement); North American
Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1499 [hereinafter NAFTA Labor Side
Agreement].
64. NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement, supra note 63, art. 5 ("[E]ach Party shall
effectively enforce its environmental laws and regulations through appropriate governmental
action. . . ."); NAFTA Labor Side Agreement, supra note 62, art. 3 ("Each Party shall promote
compliance with and effectively enforce its labor law. . . .").
65. NAFTA Labor Side Agreement, supra note 63, arts. 39-41. If a losing party failed to pay
its fine, other parties could suspend benefits under the agreement up to the amount of the fine. Id.
art. 41.1.
66. See id. art. 27.1 (noting that the dispute resolution provisions can only be triggered
"[fjollowing presentation to the Council under Article 26(1) of an [Evaluation Committee of
Experts] final report that addresses the enforcement of a Party's occupational safety and health,
child labor or minimum wage technical labor standards"); see also Cathleen Cimino-Isaacs, Labor
Standards in the TPP, in TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP: AN ASSESSMENT 261, 265-66 (Cathleen

Cimino-Isaacs & Jeffrey J. Schott eds., 2016) (discussing the evolution of labor provisions in U.S.
FTAs).
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throughout the world.67 Labor interests soon became dissatisfied,
however. The NAFTA Side Agreements model of regulation did not
require governments to adopt any particular labor standards. Indeed,
it explicitly recognized "the right of each Party to establish its own
domestic labor standards." 68 Later, when President George W. Bush
began pushing for a series of new free trade agreements with Panama,
Korea, Colombia, and Peru, advocates and their congressional allies
argued that labor and environmental chapters needed to contain more
stringent requirements.
The blueprint for these new requirements became known as the
"May 10" consensus, after the date on which the George W. Bush
administration reached terms with congressional leaders. 69 The
agreement contained two key components. First, the labor and
environmental chapters of trade agreements would henceforth contain
substantive standards with which all parties must comply. Those
substantive standards would be drawn from existing international
agreements and instruments-standards from the International
Labour Organization and multilateral environmental agreements,
respectively. 70 Second, both chapters would be enforceable on the same
terms as the ordinary trade provisions, meaning that a breaching party
could face trade sanctions.7 1 Lest anyone think these new obligations
would require anything of the United States, the U.S. Trade
Representative hastened to clarify that they would not: "We [the United
States] have nothing to fear from taking on FTA commitments [based
on international labor and environmental standards] as well and
subjecting those commitments to the FTA dispute settlement
process . . . ."72 Labor and environmental chapters in free trade
agreements were still for others, not for developed countries.
The May 10 consensus still provides the framework for labor and
environmental chapters. The TPP's labor and environmental provisions

67. For examples of labor and environment chapters in non-U.S. agreements, see CETA,
supra note 48, chs. 23 (Trade and Labour), 24 (Trade and the Environment); Agreement on Labour
Cooperation Between Canada and the Republic of Honduras, Can.-Hond., Nov. 5, 2013, B-EC2/EN,
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/
honduras/labour-travail.aspx?lang--eng [https://perma.cc/MCR7-WHLT]; Free Trade Agreement
ch. 15, EU-Viet., Jan. 20, 2016, http://trade.ec.europa.euldoclib/press/index.cfm?id=1437
[https://perma.cc/PDC6-QUNX] (not yet in force) (discussing trade and sustainable development).
68.
NAFTA Labor Side Agreement, supra note 63, art. 2.
69.
See Bipartisan Trade Deal, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (May 2007), https://ustr
.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/factsheets/2007/asset upload filel2711319.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9EM9-RHDP].
70. Id.
71.

Id.

72.

Id.
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reflect this approach. 73 So too does CETA, the free trade agreement
between the EU and Canada.7 4 To be sure, the TPP contains some
additional commitments by Vietnam, Brunei, and Malaysia. These
commitments come in the form of "consistency plans"-bilateral
agreements between the United States and each of these countries that
spell out precise steps the countries in question must take to bring
themselves into compliance.7 5 Since the consistency plans were
commitments specifically to the United States, they are unlikely to
76
survive the United States' decision not to go forward with the TPP.
Had they come into force, however, the TPP's broader dispute
settlement provisions would have applied to them, allowing the United
States to enforce the agreements' terms.7 7
These consistency plans, even if they fall by the wayside in the
TPP itself, are the state-of-the-art for labor and environmental
provisions. They therefore could provide a roadmap in future trade
negotiations. Unlike the generally applicable labor and environmental
chapters, these consistency plans are not even nominally reciprocal,
creating obligations only for the developing country. The TPP thus
continues an upward march in the labor standards that trade
agreements apply to developing countries without imposing any
similar, meaningful burdens on developed countries. The existence of
substantive labor and environmental obligations, and in particular the
consistency plans, also challenges the notion, advanced in the context

See Trans-Pacific Partnership chs. 19 (Labor) & 20 (Environment), Feb. 4, 2016,
73.
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text
[https://perma.ce/5J88-28Z6] [hereinafter TPP].
74. CETA, supra note 48, chs. 22 (Trade and Sustainable Development), 23 (Trade and
Labour), 24 (Trade and Environment).
75. See, e.g., Labour Consistency Plan, Malay.-U.S., Nov. 2015, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/
[https:/perma.cc/J7VQ-L2BY]
files/TPP-Final-Text-Labour-US-MY-Labor-Consistency-Plan.pdf
(detailing obligations concerning labor laws and practices).
76. Whether the other eleven TPP parties will press forward with the agreement without the
United States remains uncertain. Japan ratified the agreement in December 2016, see Mitsuru
Obe, Japan Ratifies Trans-PacificParntership, Which Trump Has Promised to Leave, WALL ST. J.
(Dec. 9, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/j apan-ratifies-trans-pacific-partnership-which-trumphas-promised-to-leave-1481273551 [https://perma.cc/JA2P-C5VH], but other countries are more
skeptical. See Gabrielle Chan, Malcolm Turnbull Cools on TPP Ratification in Face of Hostile
Senate, GUARDIAN (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/jan/26/malcolmturnbull-cools-on-tpp-ratification-in-face-of-hostile-senate [https://perma.cc/8EMX-9LE5].
77. Third-party participation, normally allowed in trade disputes, is not permitted under the
consistency plans. See, e.g, United States-Vietnam Plan for the Enhancement of Trade and Labour
Relations art. VII.4, EXECUTIVE OFF. PRESIDENT U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Feb. 4, 2016),

https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Labour-US-VN-Plan-for-Enhancement-ofTrade-and-Labour-Relations.pdf [https://perma.cclK7VP-68JS] ("This Plan shall be subject to
dispute settlement under Chapter 28 (Dispute Settlement) of the TPP Agreement, except for
Article 28.14 (Third Party Participation), which shall not apply.").
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of the WTO, that member states will not agree to international rules
that create obligations to redistribute the gains from trade
domestically. 78 The obligations contained in the labor and
environmental chapters-for example, the obligation to provide an
effective right to unionize-require countries to protect labor interests
in a way calculated to increase labor interests' share of the gains from
trade. The consistency plans do even more, providing for the specific
means through which countries will achieve this objective. In so doing,
they indicate that at least some nations are willing to agree to domestic
rules on redistribution in the context of trade agreements.
At the same time, countries have chosen to focus on ensuring
that countries do not reduce the labor standards below a specified
minimum in order to attract foreign businesses. Preventing a race to
the bottom-in which countries must lower their labor or
environmental standards to keep jobs at home-should in theory
prevent some jobs in the developed countries from moving overseas to
take advantage of lower standards and the associated lower production
costs. The May 10 consensus stops short, however, of requiring that
countries do anything beyond observe international minimum
standards. It does not require them to tackle economic inequality
directly.
Labor and environmental chapters in trade agreements have a
number of other drawbacks. As Senator Elizabeth Warren has pointed
out, the labor and environmental provisions continue to have weaker
enforcement provisions than the investment chapters of preferential
trade agreements.7 9 Foreign investors can directly challenge
government action that violates investor rights under the investment
chapters of trade agreements like the TPP or NAFTA.s 0 By contrast,
only governments can enforce the labor and environmental chapters
through inter-state dispute resolution. This unequal treatment
prompted several hundred law and economics professors to sign a letter
urging Congress to reject trade agreements like the TPP that include
investor-state dispute settlement provisions.8 1
78. See Marceau, supra note 34 (noting WTO members' resistance to measures on
redistribution as an inappropriate invasion of the domestic sphere).
79. Elizabeth Warren, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Clause Everyone Should Oppose,
WASH. POST (Feb. 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/kill-the-disputesettlement-language-in-the-trans-pacific-partnership2015/02/25/ec7705a2-bdle-11e4-b274e5209a3bc9a9_story.html?utmjterm=.eb0432f03ff9 [https://perma.cc/5E62-MX5N].
80.
See TPP, supra note 73, ch. 9, section B (Investor-State Dispute Settlement); North
American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter
NAFTA] (Settlement of Disputes between a Party and an Investor of Another Party).
81.
220+ Law and Economics Professors Urge Congress to Reject the TPP and Other
ProspectiveDeals That Include Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), PUB. CITIZEN (Sept. 7,
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Moreover, governments' resolve to actually bring such cases
remains uncertain. No mechanism exists to legally compel a
government to bring a labor or environmental case (just as no
mechanism exists to compel a government to bring a dispute
challenging a failure to comply with the agreement's trade
liberalization provisions). 82 To date, the United States has only ever
pursued one case under the labor or environmental chapters through to
formal dispute settlement. 83 That case, against Guatemala under the
Central American Free Trade Agreement ("CAFTA-DR"), alleged
violations by Guatemala of a number of labor rights, including the
rights to collective bargaining and the freedom of association. 84
Perhaps more importantly, cynicism about the effectiveness of
labor and environmental standards runs high. Writing about the TPP's
labor provisions, Human Rights Watch notes that
Human Rights Watch and others have expressed concerns that the agreement's labor
chapter and associated bilateral agreements will not adequately safeguard labor rights in
TPP countries with poor labor rights records, notably Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei....
[T]he extent to which [the labor provisions] will be implemented or enforced is unclear,
particularly given poor enforcement of labor rights provisions in other trade agreements
85
and under each country's domestic laws.

Furthermore, critics argue that "[c]ountries such as Vietnam would
have to completely revolutionize their legal systems to comply with the
labor-union requirements, which doesn't seem likely." 86

2016),
http://www.citizen.org/documents/isds-law-economics-professors-letter-Sept-2016.pdf
[https://perma.cclWT3K-V5GB] ("ISDS grants foreign corporations and investors a special legal
privilege: the right to initiate dispute settlement proceedings against a government for actions
that allegedly violate loosely defined investor rights to seek damages from taxpayers for the
corporation's lost profits.").
82. Domestic groups such as the AFL-CIO can file complaints with the Department of Labor,
which can lead to formal disputes, although the government is not required to initiate a dispute.
Under the United States Generalized System of Preferences, recipients of benefits can also be, and
have been, penalized for failing to abide by labor standards. See Cimino-Isaacs, supra note 66, at
274-76 (discussing the enforcement of the TPP labor commitments).
83. Another potential dispute, against Bahrain, is in consultations. See BahrainSubmission
Under U.S.-Bahrain FTA, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/labor/

bilateral-and-regional-trade-agreements/Bahrain-submission-under-US-Bahrain-FTA
(last
visited Jan. 9, 2017) [https://perma.cc/SX8E-QQ8E].
84.
See In the Matter of Guatemala-Issues Relating to the Obligations Under Article
16.2.1(a) of the CAFTA-DR, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/labor/

bilateral-and-regional-trade-agreements/guatemala-submission-under-cafta-dr
(last visited Jan.
9, 2017) [https://perma.cc/E6YL-RRBF] (presenting a list of documents relating to the labor
enforcement case against Guatemala).
85.
Q&A: The Trans-Pacific Partnership, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan. 12, 2016, 3:32 PM),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/01/12/qa-trans-pacific-partnership
[https://perma.cc/E7Q56KM5]).
86. Alana Semuels, The TPPs Uneven Attempt at Labor Protection, ATLANTIC (Jan. 22,
2016),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/01/tpp-mexico-labor-rights/426501/
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Other organizations expressed dismay that the TPP did not
impose "consistency" plans on major U.S. trading partners with poor
labor practices, most notably Mexico.8 7 In Mexico, the United States'
third largest trading partner behind China and Canada, only one
percent of workers belong to a union, and workers have struggled to get
better rights.8 8 The lack of a consistency plan with respect to Mexico led
the Labor Advisory Committee, a group of U.S. labor-union
representatives, to oppose the TPP. 8 9
Still others expressed doubts that the U.S. government would
hold even those countries with consistency plans accountable. Cathy
Feingold, the director of the International Department at the AFL-CIO,
noted that Vietnam had a five-year grace period in which to implement
changes such as allowing workers to unionize at the factory level. 90 The
market access for U.S. companies, however, would have kicked in if and
when the TPP entered into force. Feingold argued that "[o]nce the U.S.
allows companies to access the benefits of the TPP, it's very unlikely
that the government would withhold those benefits should it come
across labor abuses." 91
B. Trade Adjustment Assistance
Many governments have also used domestic policy to try to offset
the distributional effects of trade agreements. 92 The centerpiece of these
efforts has been TAA. First created in the United States in 1962 and
revised in 1974, 2002, 2009, 2011, and 2015, TAA exists for workers,
firms, and farmers. For workers, for instance, TAA provides health
care, wage insurance, funds for occupational retraining, and allowances
for job searches and relocation to workers injured by competition with
foreign producers. 93 A group of three or more workers employed by the
same firm who lose or expect to lose their jobs because of import
competition may petition the Secretary of Labor for benefits. 94 The
Secretary determines whether the workers are eligible for benefits by
[https://perma.cc/HZ9N-E5Z2] (quoting John Sifton, Human Rights Watch's Asia advocacy
director).
87.
Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92.
See Stephen Kim Park, Bridging the Global Governance Gap: Reforming the Law of
Trade Adjustment, 43 GEO. J. INT'L L. 797, 798 (2012) (discussing how countries address economic
dislocations caused by globalization).
93. Id. at 799.
94. 19 U.S.C. § 2271 (2012).
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examining a number of statutory factors. 95 The ultimate aim of the
inquiry is to establish a causal relationship between an increase in
imports and job loss. 96
As discussed above, both economic efficiency and national
sovereignty have been invoked as justifications for distributing the
gains from trade through domestic, rather than international, law. 97
TAA thus represents the preferred response to trade-induced economic
injuries. Economists have long argued that any negative consequences
from liberalizing trade can be sorted out through domestic policies like
TAA.98 The benefits provided by TAA aim to redistribute the gains from
trade liberalization to those who suffer from the same. Politically, TAA's
origins in the United States reflect a bargain between import competing
interests and proponents of trade liberalization. The Trade Expansion
Act of 1962 granted President Kennedy authority to negotiate major
reductions in tariffs in exchange for TAA for workers injured by the
tariff reductions.9 9 At first blush, then, TAA appears to satisfy both the
political necessity of helping those who might otherwise oppose free
trade and the economists' mandate that such help be provided without
interfering with international trade itself.
The problems with TAA are twofold. First, TAA as currently
implemented, at least in the United States, may not work very well. 100
A 2012 study prepared for the U.S. Department of Labor compared a
random sample of TAA participants with similarly situated, but TAAineligible, workers who lost their jobs at approximately the same
time. 101 Among other things, the study compared the wages of the two
95.
19 U.S.C. § 2272 (2012) (listing the statutory factors).
96.
Park, supra note 92, at 812.
97.
See Marceau, supra note 34; supra Part I.A.
98. See KRUGMAN & OBSTFELD, supra note 9, at 214-17 (critiquing the idea that trade policy
is an appropriate way to address domestic market failures such as unemployment).
99.
See Ethan Kapstein, Trade Liberalization and the Politics of Trade Adjustment
Assistance, 137 INT'L LAB. REV. 501, 506 (1998).
100. How one assesses TAA's effectiveness depends in part on what purpose one thinks TAA
serves. TAA's purpose would appear to be creating employment opportunities for those who have
lost their jobs due to trade, in which case one would ask whether TAA succeeds in getting workers
jobs with similar or better incomes than they would otherwise have obtained, or perhaps similar
to their previous employment. As explained above, data suggests TAA is not especially effective
measured in that way. But Robert Lawrence, a former economic adviser to President Clinton,
argued that "[i]f you view it as a compensation program, I would say it's reasonably effective." Tom
DiChristopher, Sizing Up the Trade Adjustment Assistance Program, CNBC (June 26, 2015),
http://www.cnbc.com/2015/06/26/is-aid-to-trade-displaced-workers-worth-the-cost.html
[https://perma.cc/3KJV-Y864] ("Between 1996 and 2004, the Bureau of Labor Statistics attributed
less than 3 percent of mass layoffs to import competition and relocation overseas.").
101. See Peter Z. Schochet et al., EstimatedImpacts for Participantsin the Trade Adjustment
Assistance (TAA) Program Under the 2002 Amendments, MATHMEMATICA POL'Y RES. (Aug. 30,
2012), https://www.mathematica-mpr.com/our-publications-and-findings/publications/estimated-
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groups over a period of four years following the loss of employment. 102
During the first two years, TAA participants both worked less and
earned lower wages than those in the non-TAA group. 10 3 This difference
can be attributed to the fact that, rather than immediately seek
alternative employment, many TAA participants chose to avail
themselves of the job training opportunities available through TAA but
not available to workers laid off for non-trade reasons. 1 0 4 But over the
last two years of the study when the TAA participants were working,
the gap narrowed but didn't vanish. In the last year of the study, TAA
participants earned $3,300 less on average than non-TAA participants
and worked only thirty-three weeks per year as compared to thirty-five

weeks. 105
Beyond the possibility that it does not work very well, TAA also
arguably discriminates unfairly among workers who have lost their jobs
through no fault of their own. 106 In the last quarter of 2015, for example,
the Labor Department estimates that U.S. employers eliminated 6.8
million jobs through contraction or closing. 107 Yet the Bureau of Labor
Statistics estimates that import competition and relocation overseas
caused less than five percent of such layoffs. 108 Thus, while traderelated job losses may be one of the most visible signs of economic
dislocation, they are only the tip of the iceberg.
The second problem with TAA is that it is a purely domestic legal
program. This creates a credible commitment problem. Even if injured
workers are able to extract TAA as the price of supporting liberalized
trade, nothing guarantees that a future Congress will not cut back on
impacts-for-participants-in-the-trade-adjustment-assistance-taa-program-under-the-2002amendments [https://perma.cc/CSC9-5BP6].
102. Id. at xv.
103. Id. at xvii.
104. Id.
105. Id. The result was especially pernicious to older workers. The effect on employment and
wages was statistically insignificant for younger workers in the last two years of the study, but
significant and negative for older workers through the period of the study. Id. Other studies have
found similar results. See Kara M. Reynolds & John S. Palatucci, Does Trade Adjustment
Assistance Make a Difference?, 30 CONTEM-P. EcON. POL'Y 43 (2011).
106. See James Sherk, Congress Should Allow Trade Adjustment Assistance to Expire,
HERITAGE FOUND. (Feb. 4, 2011), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/02/congressshould-allow-trade-adjustment-assistance-to-expire#_ftn5
[https://perma.cc/SZK4-XJ5L]
("The
government should not discriminate between workers who lose their jobs because of trade and
workers who lose their jobs for other reasons.").
107. The United States had a net employment gain of one million jobs because it gained in
gross 7.8 million jobs. See News Release, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Business
Employment Dynamics-Fourth Quarter 2015 (July 27, 2016), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/
archives/cewbd_07272016.pdf [https://perma.cc/FJ36-JPG3].
108. DiChristopher, supra note 100 ("Between 1996 and 2004, the Bureau of Labor Statistics
attributed less than 3 percent of mass layoffs to import competition and relocation overseas.").
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those benefits down the road. Trade liberalization commitments, after
all, are enshrined in international agreements and implemented
through statutes that have no expiration. By contrast, trade adjustment
assistance measures typically have sunset provisions. 109 The TAA
program was last set to expire in September 2015 but was extended as
part of the Obama administration's bid to build support for the TPP. 110
Yet authorization to fund the program now only extends until June 30,
2021.111 At that time, workers and firms will once again have to seek
congressional approval to continue the program. The trade agreements
creating the injuries to which TAA responds will continue indefinitely.
This arrangement works when labor markets adjust in the near
term to the shocks created by liberalization (and technological change).
But this disparate timing creates a mismatch when labor markets'
adjustments are sluggish. 112 Having already agreed to the trade deal,
beneficiaries of TAA have little leverage in seeking an extension of
benefits. Of course, they can always hope to use the next trade deal as
leverage, but they do not control the timing of trade negotiations.
Consequently, dividing domestic redistribution programs tied to trade,
such as TAA, from trade deals themselves ensures that domestic
programs are unlikely to be adjusted if the adverse impacts of trade on
individual communities or regions are larger or last longer than
expected. After a trade deal is in place, the agreement's proponents may
not see much value in pushing to further redistribute the gains it
creates.

109. As discussed in Part IA, economists have generally predicted that labor markets would
adjust to disruptions for trade. See Bernanke, supra note 18; Bhagwati, supranote 19. Under this
assumption, pairing time-limited TAA with an indefinite trade agreement might make sense. The
difficulty is that shocks to the employment sector, whether from technology or trade, occur today
with such frequency that labor markets may not be able to adjust. See Bhagwati, supra note 19
("Before the workers get on to the rising part of the J-curve, they run into yet more such technical
change, so that the working class gets to go from one declining segment of the J-curve to another.");
Alan S. Blinder, Free Trade's Great, but Offshoring Rattles Me, WASH. POST (May 6, 2007),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/04/AR2007050402555.html
[https://perma.cc/M4W6-PHE6] ("I would argue that there's something new about the coming
transition to service offshoring. These two powerful forces mentioned earlier-technological
advancement and the rise of China and India-suggest that this particular transition will be large,
lengthy and painful.").
110. Greg Nelson, On Trade, Here's What the President Signed into Law, WHITE HOUSE (June
29, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/06/29/trade-here-s-what-president-signed-law
[https://perma.cc/T2EN-5NZC].
111. 19 U.S.C. § 2317(a) (2012).
112. See supranote 109; see also Autor, Dorn & Hanson, supra note 8; Pierce & Schott, supra
note 8.
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III. TOWARD AN EcONOMIC DEVELOPMENT CHAPTER IN
TRADE AGREEMENTS

TAA and trade agreements' labor and environmental chapters
have lost their lustre. Saving liberalized trade requires new solutions.
In this Part, I propose a new Economic Development Chapter to be
included in all future trade agreements. Economic Development
Chapters would have at a minimum three components. In Section A, I
argue that the Economic Development Chapter should contain
obligations to expend a certain amount of funding per year on programs
that redistribute the gains from trade. These fiscal commitments would
be indexed so that they rose and fell with the losses created by trade
agreements. Although nations require flexibility in the kinds of
programs they can choose to satisfy this commitment, the Economic
Development Chapter should at a minimum push states to use their
economic development programs to invest in public education and
infrastructure. These priorities are already identified in a Development
chapter within the TPP. The obligations proposed here are thus only an
extension and deepening of soft norms already found in the most recent
generation of trade agreements. In Section B, I tackle the monitoring
and enforcement of the substantive obligations. The Economic
Development Chapter would require countries to collect data on the
domestic winners and losers of liberalized trade and to report that data,
along with measures taken to redistribute the gains from trade
domestically, to an Economic Development Committee. This committee,
a species of which is also already envisioned by the TPP's Development
chapter, would be empowered to issue recommendations based on
member states' reports, in the manner of human rights committees.
Finally, failure to comply with these obligations would be enforceable
through inter-state dispute settlement.
Section C concludes with a brief discussion of the new political
economy of trade agreements. Beyond helping those individuals and
communities that have been left behind by rising inequality, these
proposals would shore up the political consensus in favor of liberalizing
trade. They would do so by solving the commitment problem that
bedevils efforts to address trade dislocations through domestic policy.
By tying domestic policies that help those who suffer or perceive
themselves to suffer from international trade to the rules liberalizing
trade, trade agreements can offer something for everyone.
This approach flips the presumption that exists in current labor
and environment chapters. Traditionally, developed countries,
especially the United States, have approached the problem of traderelated inequality within their own countries by trying to raise the level
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of labor protection in foreign countries through trade agreements.
Labor and environmental chapters, although nominally applicable to
all treaty members, are understood to apply chiefly to those countries
with poor labor practices. Negotiators in developed countries hope to
make their own workers better off, or to be seen as trying to make their
own workers better off, without actually having to do anything
domestically for their workers.
Critics of trade agreements have bought into this orientation.
They focus on improving labor and environmental standards in trade
agreements and on removing ISDS provisions. These demands reflect
genuine concern for labor and environmental standards in developing
countries, as well as the possibility that ISDS will be used by
corporations to chill efforts to regulate a host of non-economic issues,
such as health, safety, and the environment. In focusing on these
reforms, though, critics in the United States and EU miss an
opportunity to obtain concessions that more directly impact the welfare
of economically struggling communities at home.
In particular, removing ISDS deprives business interests of an
important tool in countries that lack independent or well-developed
judiciaries. The gains in terms of the right to regulate in developed
countries are also relatively small. To be sure, there have been investorstate arbitral decisions that many view as striking the wrong balance
between the rights of foreign corporations and host governments. 113
More recent decisions, however, have recognized the government's right
to regulate so long as it does so in a generally applicable fashion. 114
Indeed, to date the United States has never lost an investor-state
dispute. While that record is unlikely to remain intact in perpetuity, it
testifies to the fairly limited marginal impact ISDS provisions have in
countries with robust domestic legal systems.11 5
113. See, e.g., Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1,
(Aug. 30, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 212 (2002) (holding that Mexico violated NAFTA chapter
11's fair and equitable treatment and expropriation provisions through its subnational
governments' denial of permits for a landfill).
114. See Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States, Award (NAFI'A Ch. 11 Arb. Tri. June 8, 2009),
[https://perma.cc/A6LAhttp://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0378.pdf
HD3L]; Methanex Corp. v. United States, Award (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Tri. Aug. 3, 2005),
[https://perma.cc/J22Mhttp://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0529.pdf
9LAX].
115. Indeed, ISDS often poses less of a constraint on domestic regulatory efforts than does the
interstate dispute process central to trade law. For example, in Mesa Power v. Canada, a NAFTA
tribunal refused to find a violation of NAFTA's investment chapter on the same facts on which a
WTO panel found a violation in Canada-RenewableEnergy, a case brought by Japan and the EU.
Compare Mesa Power Grp., LLC v. Gov't of Can., Case No. 2012-17. Award (Mar. 24, 2016) (finding
no violation), with Appellate Body Report, Canada-CertainMeasures Affecting the Renewable
Energy Generation Sector, 1 5.85, WTO Doc. WT/DS412/ABfR (adopted May 24, 2013) (finding

if 74-112

1014

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:3:985

The approach proposed here turns the tables by creating
international obligations that developed countries will have to take
affirmative steps to implement. In effect, developed countries will
commit themselves to domestic programs that will help those adversely
affected by liberalized trade. In so doing, these programs will shore up
the political consensus in favor of liberalized trade in the developed
world.
A. Economic Development Obligations
The centerpiece of a new Economic Development Chapter should
be fiscal commitments to spend "new money" on economic development
programs. These fiscal requirements should have two components.
First, they should specify a threshold level of spending below which
economic development spending may not fall for the first ten or fifteen
years that the trade agreement in question is in force. Countries can
establish that threshold level through negotiations, both among parties
and within domestic legislatures, prior to ratification. Current levels of
TAA spending might provide a useful benchmark. As Economic
Development Chapters spread, the thresholds used in earlier
agreements may provide a starting point for establishing the threshold
in later agreements. This threshold would ensure that domestic
legislatures cannot renege on economic development commitments
shortly after an agreement comes into force without violating the terms
of the agreement. Having the threshold sunset after a certain period of
time also ensures that countries are not tied to an antiquated number.
Second, governments' spending obligations should be indexed in
such a way that they rise with the effects of dislocation and fall as those
adversely affected by trade recover (subject to the threshold described
above). Indexing governments' spending requirements ensures that
assistance over the life of an agreement remains appropriate to the
needs created by the agreement. Although a number of possible
indexing techniques might be used, the most appropriate index might
be a measure of unemployment and wage depression or stagnation
caused by international trade within subnational political units, such
as U.S. states. The government's obligation to spend could be subject to
a cap. For example, the cap might provide that the United States cannot
be obligated to spend more nationally than fifty percent of the gains it
attributes to liberalized trade.

violation), and Appellate Body Report, Canada-MeasuresRelating to the Feed-in Tariff Program,
1 5.85, WTO Doe. WT/DS426/AB/R (adopted May 24, 2013) (same). Moreover, while the United
States has never lost an ISDS case, it regularly loses WTO cases.
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To give a concrete example, the government might calculate that
the United States gained $135 billion in 2018 from membership in
NAFTA. A new Economic Development Chapter, negotiated by the
Trump administration as part of NAFTA's renegotiation, might cap a
country's economic development obligations at fifty percent of the
annual gains from trade. The U.S. cap (presumably for the following
fiscal year to allow for data collection and program implementation)
would thus be $67.5 billion. An increase in lost employment and wages
attributable to trade above benchmark levels (e.g., the levels during the
year the agreement entered into force) could lead to an increase in the
United States' spending obligation above the threshold discussed above.
After the initial period described above lapses, declines in employment
losses and wage depression attributable to trade would lead to declining
economic development obligations. In other words, if trade does not
create economic harms, the economic development obligations will
naturally sunset.
Given membership in multiple trade agreements, attribution of
gains or losses to specific agreements might be, or might become,
difficult. For this reason, it might make sense to express the gains as
an estimate of the total gains from liberalized trade. The Economic
Development obligations would thus be a common obligation across
trade agreements. The threshold requirement would be individually
negotiated and its duration specific to each agreement, but subsequent
agreements would not change the indexing rules. For example, an
Economic Development Chapter in a renegotiated NAFTA might
impose a $50 billion per year minimum spending requirement for ten
years, indexed as described above. TTIP might enter into force five
years into NAFTA's ten year period and include a $60 billion spending
requirement for ten years, as well as the indexing requirement. The
effect of TTIP's entry into force would be to raise the United States'
spending floor to $60 billion and extend it for an additional five years.
The indexing procedure would not change, although now both NAFTA
members and TTIP members would be able to enforce the economic
development obligations, as described below.
The spending requirements provide the backbone of the
economic development obligations that states would undertake. States'
commitments could only be fulfilled by "new money." In other words,
states would not be permitted to count existing expenditures to fulfill
their economic development objectives (except perhaps expenditures to
satisfy economic development objectives in other trade agreements, as
described above).
Beyond that, states would have a great deal of latitude to choose
the kinds of programs on which they spend. The Economic Development
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Chapter should not commit governments to specific forms of assistance.
This discretion would reflect the different contexts in which social
programs occur and the traditional view that trade agreements should
interfere as little as possible with behind-the-border policies. Requiring
specific programs, such as unemployment insurance or relocation
allowances,
would
tie
governments'
hands
and
prevent
experimentation. Studies of TAA, for example, indicate mixed results
as to what kinds of programs actually deliver the most effective
assistance. 1 1 6 Allowing experimentation by governments thus offers the
possibility of learning. At the same time, some programs may be
effective and feasible in Country A but not in Country B. Countries have
different needs and different capabilities, and Economic Development
Chapters should be sensitive to this fact.
This discretion may also make economic development
obligations more palatable by allowing politicians to craft programs
that achieve objectives beyond just addressing the adverse effects of
trade. In this sense, the international obligation could become a site for
logrolling-"the combining of multiple measures, none of which would
pass on its own, into an omnibus proposition that receives majority
support.""' Constituencies that support economic development
programs could join forces with those who may not have an interest in
economic development per se, but who will agree to support the
inclusion of those obligations in international agreements so long as the
economic development programs actually implemented address their
priorities. 118
Although states would have discretion in the kinds of programs
they choose, an Economic Development Chapter might still push
member states toward particular categories of spending. Traditional
trade adjustment assistance focuses on the individuals affected by the
impacts of trade. Research into social mobility and economic inequality,
however, has shown that the effects of economic dislocation can be
widespread and multigenerational. 119 The National Bureau of
Economic Research has found that, not surprisingly, parents' income

&

116. See supraPart 1I.B.
117. Robert D. Cooter & Michael D. Gilbert, A Theory of Direct Democracy and the Single
Subject Rule, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 687, 689 (2010).
118. See, e.g., Anthony M. Bertelli & Christian R. Grose, Secretariesof Pork? A New Theory of
Distributive Public Policy, 71 J. POL. 926, 934 (2009) (arguing that TAA provides bureaucratic
discretion that introduces an element of pork-barrel politics to the program).
119. See, e.g., Patrick Wightman & Sheldon Danziger, Multi-Generational Income
Disadvantageand the EducationalAttainment of Young Adults, 35 RES. SOC. STRATIFICATION
MOBILITY 53, 54 (2012) (reviewing the literature linking socioeconomic status during childhood to
later life educational and employment outcomes).
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strongly predicts children's income. 120 Globalization has also been
linked to the decline of local communities and associated social support
networks. 121 By pushing investments toward two areas specificallypublic education and infrastructure 122-Economic
Development
Chapters can address two problems linked, at least in the popular
imagination, to globalization. They can better ensure that governments
take care of those least able to adapt to the globalized economy. At the
same time, they can also provide an impetus to restore local
communities, both in economic and social terms.
To unpack these two categories somewhat, Economic
Development Chapters should direct countries to significantly increase
their spending on public education in adversely affected communities.
For instance, those communities most negatively impacted by
liberalized trade might receive x percentage of the economic growth
attributed to liberalized trade in the form of investment in public
education and infrastructure. Communities less severely affected would
receive a smaller percentage, and so forth. Again, the treaty need not
put restrictions on precisely what kinds of education the government
must fund. The government might, for instance, offer vocational
training beyond that required as part of TAA to workers seeking new
jobs. Alternatively, the government might choose simply to put the
money into primary and secondary schools in the adversely affected
communities.
Increased investment in public education can be especially
useful in providing opportunities for the children of displaced workers
to find their way in the new economic landscape. Because educational
achievement predicts future income, disparities in educational

120. Alison Griswold, Here's the Startling Degree to Which Your Parents Determine Your
Success, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/parents-determine-childsuccess-income-inequality-2014-1 [https://perma.cc/CX75-NS8K]. Other studies have found that
parental income predicts educational achievement. See Greg J. Duncan, Pamela A. Morris & Chris
Rodrigues, Does Money Really Matter? EstimatingImpacts of Family Income on Young Children's
Achievement with Data from Random-Assignment Experiments, 47 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL.

1263 (2011).
121. Manfred B. Steger, Robert Putnam, Social Capital, and a Suspect Named Globalization,
in SOCIAL CAPITAL: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON COMMUNITY AND "BOWLING ALONE" 260, 263 (Scott

L. McLean, David A. Schultz & Manfred B. Steger eds., 2002) ("I posit a direct relationship between
the waning stocks of social capital and the politics of neoliberal globalization . . . .").
122. Cf. Lawrence Summers, The Next President Should Make Infrastructure Spending a
Priority, WASH. POST (Sept. 11, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/whoever-winsthe-presidential-election-must-make-infrastructure-spending-a-priority/2016/09/11/406ef0ee[https://perma.cc/M5TE76c2-1 1e6-b786-19d0cbled06c-story.html?utm-term=.2ba6335d3da5
NTY3] ("Economists and politicians of all persuasions are increasingly concluding that higher
infrastructure investment can create quality jobs and provide economic stimulus without posing
the risks of easy-money monetary policies in the short run.").
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opportunities are a major driver of economic inequality. 123 Wealthier
communities can afford to spend more on education, while poorer
communities cannot. Communities that suffer job losses from
liberalized trade will be less able to invest in public education, pushing
the losses from trade liberalization and the costs of economic inequality
onto the next generation. Public education can offset these costs.
A requirement that nations invest in infrastructure relies on the
same rationale of boosting both economic opportunity and political
support for trade agreements. Studies have repeatedly confirmed that
infrastructure investments can drive economic growth by creating
employment and creating the platform for further investment in
businesses. 12 4 Infrastructure investments are also very visible,
illustrating that liberalized trade can work for all communities. The
definition of infrastructure should, once again, be broad in order to
allow countries flexibility in implementation. The definition might take
the form of a non-exhaustive list of measures, including the
construction of roads, bridges, railways, and high-speed internet
connections. Moreover, unlike education, infrastructure spending need
not necessarily target the geographic areas adversely affected by trade
liberalization. If people are moving out of economically depressed
regions, governments might boost economic opportunity more
effectively by investing in infrastructure in high growth areas. On the
other hand, if labor mobility remains limited even in the face of slow
economic growth, 125 infrastructure projects in adversely affected areas
may make more sense.

123.

Sean F. Reardon, The Widening Academic Achievement Gap Between the Rich and the

Poor: New Evidence and Possible Explanations, in WHITHER OPPORTUNITY? RISING INEQUALITY,
SCHOOLS, AND CHILDREN'S LIFE CHANCES 91, 91 (Greg J. Duncan & Richard J. Murnane eds., 2011)

("As the income gap between high- and low-income families has widened, has the achievement gap
between children in high- and low-income families also widened? The answer, in brief, is yes.").
124. ALEXANDER J. FIELD, A GREAT LEAP FORWARD: 1930s DEPRESSION AND U.S. ECONOMIC

GROWTH 2 (2011) (arguing that the conditions for economic growth in the latter half of the
twentieth century were laid in large part by "the organizational and technological transformation
of transportation and distribution (wholesale and retail trade) made possible by street, highway,
bridge, and tunnel construction"); BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE

OF SHARED RESOURCES (2013); Josh Bivens, The Short- and Long-Term Impact of Infrastructure
Investments on Employment and Economic Activity in the U.S. Economy, ECON. POL'Y INST. (July
1, 2014), http://www.epi.org/files/2014/impact-of-infrastructure-investments.pdf [https://perma.cc/
E922-VRQR] (finding that "infrastructure investments provide the potential to boost economywide productivity growth").
125. See Olivier Jean Blanchard & Lawrence F. Katz, Regional Evolutions, 1 BROOKINGS
PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 1 (1992); Edward L. Glaeser & Jospeh Gyourko, Urban Decline and
Durable Housing, 113 J. POL. ECON. 345 (2005); Richard H. Topel, Local Labor Markets, 94 J. POL.
ECON. S111 (1986) (all arguing that labor can be slow to relocate in response to shifts in labor
markets).
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Linking trade agreements to efforts to address broader economic
inequality can help rebuild the political consensus in favor of
liberalizing trade. Educational and infrastructure spending provide a
visible symbol that trade agreements are returning benefits to those
communities that might otherwise oppose them. This visible sign is
important because psychological research into voting demonstrates
that voters usually do not vote in their own personal self-interest. 12 6
Rather, they identify with their communities and vote in what they
perceive as the community's interest. 127 This fact has been used to
explain why so many American voters who have not been adversely
affected by international trade nevertheless support the protectionist
rhetoric of politicians like Donald Trump. As psychologist David Sears
suggests, these voters identify with those they believe to have been
adversely affected by trade even if they themselves are not. 12 8
Delivering visible community benefits can thus go a long way toward
rebuilding the fraying consensus in favor of political liberalization. If
many of the voters in countries like the United States and the UK
oppose liberalized trade regimes because of their perceived effects on
others in the community, delivering highly visible benefits to those
same individuals can change political attitudes.
Finally, beyond the obligations contained in an Economic
Development Chapter, we should ask how feasible such commitments
are. The answer: not as far-fetched as they sound. Indeed, the TPP
already contains a Development chapter.129 The Development chapter
represents the continuation of a trend toward recognizing the
importance of domestic regulatory and policy objectives in trade and
investment agreements.1 3 0 Moreover, the TPP's Development chapter
126. See David Sears & Carolyn Funk, The Role of Self-Interest in Social and Political
Attitudes, 24 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 1, 76 (1991) ('The conclusion is quite clear:

self-interest ordinarily does not have much effect upon the ordinary citizen's sociopolitical
attitudes.").
127. See Jeff Guo, Stop Blaming Racism for Donald Trump's Rise, WASH. POST (Aug. 19,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/08/19/stop-blaming-racism-fordonald-trumps-rise/?utmterm=.9fb3aba3cba8 [https://perma.cc/P65L-2VM9]:
I don't know that voters are connecting that to an improvement in their own economic
situations, so much as they believe that a lot of people are harmed by these trade
agreements, that a lot of industries moved overseas, and that those jobs may never come
back.... They think it's bad for people like them, or it's bad for the working class in
general.

(quoting psychologist David Sears).
128. Id.
129. See TPP, supra note 73, ch. 23.
130. See, e.g., Federica Cristani, Book Review: The Right to Regulate in International
Investment Law by Aikaterini Titi Baden-Baden, 6 EuRo. J. RISK REG. 329, 329 (2015) ("The
concept of the right to regulate has become a critical element in the development of international
investment law and policy.").
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references some of the priorities mentioned above. For example, Article
23.1(2) provides:
The Parties acknowledge the importance of development in promoting inclusive economic
growth, as well as the instrumental role that trade and investment can play in
contributing to economic development and prosperity. Inclusive economic growth includes
a more broad-based distribution of the benefits of economic growth through the expansion
of business and industry, the creation of jobs, and the alleviation of poverty. 131

Article 23.3(3) goes further, linking broad-based economic growth to
"sustained high-level commitment by . ..

governments to effectively

and efficiently administer public institutions, invest in public
infrastructure, welfare, health and education systems, and foster
entrepreneurship and access to economic opportunity." 132
Despite these positive references to broad-based economic
growth and its connection to investment in education and
infrastructure, the TPP's Development chapter lacks any binding
obligations. While the parties "acknowledge" and "recognize" the
importance of these values, they do not undertake any binding
commitments with respect to these traditionally domestic policy areas.
Moreover, the TPP's dispute settlement provisions do not apply to the
Development chapter. 133 The existing Development chapter thus lacks
the teeth it would need to credibly address the economic inequality at
the heart of liberalized trade's current crisis. It does, though, provide a
starting point from which countries could negotiate future Economic
Development Chapters and indicates that developed countries are open
to including development goals, including infrastructure and education
spending, in their agreements.
B. Monitoring and Enforcement
Monitoring and enforcement of the Economic Development
Chapter would build directly on existing institutions. First, the TPP's
Development chapter already includes the creation of a Committee on
Development.1 34 The new Economic Development Chapter should
charge a similar committee with gathering data on those communities,
regions, and sectors of the economy adversely impacted by trade
liberalization and reporting that data to the Committee.1 35 Member

131. TPP, supranote 73, art. 23.1(2).
132. Id. art. 23.3(3).
133. Id. art. 23.9.
134. Id. art. 23.7.
135. In many countries these commitments would not significantly increase the informationgathering burden on members above what they already do. Many countries already keep statistics
similar to these and maintain government offices, such as the Department of Labor's Bureau of
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states would also report to the Committee on measures taken to comply
with the substantive obligations described in Section A. This
monitoring effort would resemble the monitoring mechanisms
employed by human rights treaty bodies such as the Committee on
Human Rights under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the Committee on Racial Discrimination under the
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. 136 The
Committee would be empowered to comment on nations' submissions
and offer recommendations to improve compliance, again in the manner
of human rights bodies.1 37

Second, the Economic Development Chapter would be subject to
dispute settlement, just as the labor and environmental chapters have
come to be subject to dispute settlement. If, for instance, the United
States or Canada failed to expend the required amount, another
country would be entitled to bring a dispute before an international
tribunal. If the tribunal finds a violation, the complaining government
would be entitled to retaliate against the violating state by raising trade
barriers. 138 The trade barriers the complaining state could impose
would be high enough to offset the foregone expenditures. 1 3 9 For
Labor Statistics or Bureau of International Labor Affairs, that can adjust their data collection and
analysis. Indeed, the U.S. implementation package for the TPP proposes the creation of a new
office to assist in implementing the TPP, demonstrating that the creation of such offices does not
pose a significant difficulty. See The Trans-Pacific PartnershipAgreement Implementation Act
Draft Statement of Administrative Action, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/
sites/default/files[DRAFT-Statement-of-Administrative-Action.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2017)
[https://perma.cclVA53-SH39 ("Section 105(a) of the [implementing legislation] authorizes the
President to establish within the Department of Commerce an office responsible for providing
administrative assistance to dispute settlement panels established under Chapter 28 (Dispute
Settlement) of the TPP . . . .").
136. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 28, Dec. 16, 1966, 99 U.N.T.S.
171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination art. 8, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter CERD].
137. ICCPR, supranote 136, art. 40.4 ("The Committee shall study the reports submitted by
the States Parties to the present Convention. It shall transmit its reports, and such general
comments as it may consider appropriate, to the States Parties."); CERD, supra note 136, art. 9
("The Committee .. . may make suggestions and general recommendations based on the
examination of the reports and information received from States Parties."); id. art. 11 ("If a State
Party considers that another State Party is not giving effect to the provisions of this Convention,
it may bring the matter to the attention of the Committee.").
138. This kind of retaliation, known as the suspension of concessions, is the mechanism
through which trade obligations are enforced. See TPP, supra note 73, art. 28.20 (entitled "Nonimplementation-Compensation and Suspension of Benefits"); Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 22, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401
[hereinafter DSU] (same).
139. See, e.g., DSU, supra note 138, art. 22.4 ("The level of the suspension of concessions or
other obligations authorized by the DSB shall be equivalent to the level of the nullification or
impairment."); TPP, supra note 73, art. 28.3.3 ("A complaining Party may, [after, inter alia,
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example, if Vietnam prevailed in a case against Canada alleging that
Canada failed to spend $50 million a year that it was required to spend,
Vietnam could raise tariffs on products in a way calculated to raise $50
million a year.
One might object that the rules contained in Economic
Development Chapters are unlikely to ever be enforced against
developed countries like the United States or the EU. Would Vietnam
really bring a case challenging the United States' failure to assist
American workers? Surely, Vietnam would not bring such a case for the
purpose of aiding American workers. That does not mean, however, that
Vietnam would never bring such a case. Trade disputes often have a titfor-tat aspect to them. If the United States brings a claim challenging
Indian policies as violating trade rules, India may very well turn around
and file a claim against the United States in retaliation. 14 0 The
reciprocal nature of the decision to bring a trade dispute means that
disputes about the Economic Development Chapters are possible
because bringing such a case could be in the complaining party's
interest, even though the ultimate remedy does not benefit the
complaining party. At a minimum, the mere possibility of a claim
creates pressure for developed countries to comply with the chapter's
terms.
Moreover, in some instances enforcing the chapter's obligation
could indirectly benefit the complaining party. Imagine two trading
partners, such as Mexico and the United States, that border each other
and face an immigration problem. The United States might consider
bringing a claim challenging Mexico's implementation of the Economic
Development Chapter as a benign and human method of addressing
illegal immigration from Mexico to the United States. By the same
token, Mexico might bring a claim against the United States in order to
protect Mexicans or Mexican-Americans working in the United
States. 141
prevailing in a dispute], provide written notice to the responding Party that it intends to suspend
benefits of equivalent effect.").
140. For example, India indicated that it would file a trade case challenging the lawfulness of
government support for the renewable energy sector in the United States after the U.S. filed and
won a similar case against India. Ian Clover, India Confirms it Will File 16 Solar Cases Against
US Under WTO Dispute, PV MAG. (May 13, 2016), https://www.pv-magazine.com/2016/05/13/
india-confirms-it-will-file-16-solar-cases-against-us-under-wto-dispute_100024597/ [https://perma
.cc/JT79-P2LQ]. The WTO's Appellate Body ruled in the U.S.'s favor on Friday, September 16, and
India filed its case on Monday, September 19.
141. Indeed, protecting Mexicans in Mexico provided the impetus for the famous Avena
decision in which the International Court of Justice ruled, in a case brought by Mexico, that the
United States violated the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations ("VCCR") when it did not
notify Mexican nationals arrested in the United States of their rights under the VCCR. Avena and
Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31).
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One might also argue that private parties such as the AFL-CIO
should be able to directly enforce the terms of the labor and
environmental chapters. The fact that the labor and environmental
chapters are not privately enforceable, while the investment chapters
are, has been a bone of contention. 142 Private enforceability of economic
development obligations differs from private enforcement of investment
commitments, however, because the private party most likely to seek
enforcement of the economic development obligations would do so
against his own country (i.e., the AFL-CIO seeking to have the United
States satisfy its economic development obligations).
Such private enforcement could come in three forms. First,
private parties could be authorized to file private complaints with the
Development Committee, which would then evaluate the complaint
and, if warranted, issue recommendations on how the member state in
question could address the complaint. Such private mechanisms are
common in human rights treaties. Typically, member states can join an
additional protocol that gives the Committee jurisdiction to entertain
complaints from members' citizens. Because it is optional, some
countries can permit private claims while others may choose not to.
Second, a binding dispute resolution system could hear private claims,
along the lines of the European Court of Human Rights. Unlike the
Committee, a tribunal would issue legally binding rulings. Third, since
countries will typically pass implementing legislation, they could create
a domestic private right of action.
The first option is the most politically feasible. Developed
countries are unlikely to permit their citizens to bring domestic
lawsuits challenging appropriation decisions, and they almost certainly
would not permit their citizens to bring such a claim before an
international tribunal. Since one of the primary purposes of an
Economic Development Chapter is to rebuild a broad coalition in favor
of international trade agreements, Economic Development Chapters
themselves should not directly include a private right of action that can
lead to binding penalties.
C. The New PoliticalEconomy of Trade Agreements
Linking economic development objectives to liberalized trade in
a single instrument solves a political economy problem threatening to
derail the trade regime. The benefits of trade agreements to consumers
are real and very significant but also diffuse and not necessarily obvious
to the average citizen. The costs of trade agreements, on the other hand,
142. See supra Part II.A.
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are concentrated, visible, and-because trade and technology have
similar effects-prone to overestimation. In light of these factors, the
traditional economic and sovereignty arguments for leaving questions
about the distribution of the gains from trade to domestic policy are no
longer tenable. The perception that trade fuels inequality has to be
dealt with within trade agreements.
Most importantly, Economic Development Chapters will tie the
hands of domestic legislatures by linking trade liberalization with
domestic policies that share the gains from trade. This commitment will
reduce the flexibility the legislature has. Should the legislature choose
not to fund its development commitments under trade agreements, the
country will be in violation of the agreement and risk the possibility of
a dispute and retaliation by other parties. This loss of flexibility may be
suboptimal both from an efficiency perspective (because governments
may not have the same degree of freedom to adapt to changed
circumstances) and from a sovereignty perspective (because trade
agreements will establish further disciplines on behind-the-border
policies). But it may be the best available given contemporary political
constraints.
In exchange for this loss of flexibility, trade negotiators and the
business interests that favor liberalized trade will receive additional
support from labor unions and domestic constituencies that stand to
benefit from the Economic Development Chapter. The construction and
education sectors, for instance, should become backers of free trade.
Those communities hardest hit by technological change might expect to
do better by supporting trade agreements than by opposing them. After
all, individual communities are powerless to stop the technological
innovation that, on any account, plays a critical role in driving job loss
and economic inequality. Just as opposing trade agreements is their
chance to give voice to their discontent, so supporting trade is a chance
to leverage their political clout.
Countries, and individual constituencies within developed
countries in particular, should also favor a robust Economic
Development Chapter, making agreement and implementation
politically feasible. Developing countries should favor an enhanced
Economic Development Chapter because it would bring stability to the
process of ratifying and implementing trade agreements. Trade
negotiators frequently must return to the negotiating table to address
demands from disaffected constituencies within developed countries.
This was true with the NAFTA Side Agreements, negotiated by
President Clinton as the price of NAFTA ratification. It was also true
after the George W. Bush administration and congressional leaders
reached an agreement on the May 10 Consensus. Only after Peru,
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Korea, Panama, and Colombia made changes to their domestic law to
bring themselves into compliance with this new norm did Congress take
up legislation to implement trade agreements with those countries.143
Nor is this phenomenon limited to the United States. Europe has
recently gone back to the negotiating table to seek further concessions
from Canada in the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic Trade
Agreement.144 These provisions address concerns in Europe about the
ability of corporations to use investor-state dispute settlement to
challenge domestic health and safety rules. 145
Using treaties to commit to certain domestic policies is a wellknown tactic. 146 Domestic governments that hope to secure the longterm stability of policies that they fear may be reversed by subsequent
governments often look to enshrine those commitments in international
agreements. The classic example, described by Andrew Moravcsik,
involves new democracies in Eastern Europe entrenching democratic
norms by signing up to human rights treaties. 147 These newly
democratic countries hoped that human rights obligations and
institutions like the European Court of Human Rights would pressure
future governments to maintain democratic policies in the face of
incentives to revert to oppressive forms of government. 148
Incorporating domestic development policies into trade
agreements offers a similar prospect: entrenching both liberalized trade
and development policies in international agreements and associated
domestic implementing legislation. In an era in which austerity policies
and the retrenchment of the public sector have swept the developed
world, the benefit to trade's losers should be clear. But the benefit is
equally real for international trade's supporters. The political
consensus in favor of free trade is eroding. Rebuilding that consensus
requires tying free trade's fate to the fate of those who do not hold the
143. See Bipartisan Trade Deal, supra note 69.
144. Commission Attempts to Reopen CETA Negotiations with Canada to Revisit ISDS, INV.
TREATY NEWS (Feb. 29, 2016), https://www.iisd.org/itn/2016/02/29/commission-attempts-toreopen-ceta-negotiations-with-canada-to-revisit-isds/ [https://perma.ccl8X7Y-XPF4].
145. Id. ("The CETA provides for a more traditional-style ISDS [investor-state dispute
settlement] mechanism, which is not in line with the European Union's new approach.. . . As it
currently stands, the text is seen as unlikely to be approved by the European Parliament.").
146. See, e.g., TOm GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL
COURTS IN ASIAN CASES (2000) (arguing that if constitution drafters "foresee themselves losing in
postconstitutional elections, they may seek to entrench judicial review as a form of political
insurance"); Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: DemocraticDelegation in
PostwarEurope, 54 INT'L ORG. 217 (2000).
147. Moravcsik, supra note 146, at 220 ("[C]reating a quasi-independent judicial body is a
tactic used by governments to 'lock in' and consolidate democratic institutions, thereby enhancing
their credibility and stability vis-a-vis nondemocratic political threats.").
148. Id.
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view that, in Keynes' words, free trade is "almost ...
law." 149
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a part of the moral

CONCLUSION

A robust Economic Development Chapter is ambitious. Although
labor and environmental chapters have made great strides from
NAFTA to the TPP, they have not evolved fast enough to save free trade
from itself. As voters in the U.S. presidential election, the UK's
referendum on Brexit, and the growing support in Europe for right wing
and anti-globalization parties illustrate, desperate times call for
ambitious measures. Yet one might wonder if Economic Development
Chapters are politically feasible. After all, part of what has driven the
backlash against liberalized trade has been the retrenchment of the
public sector. Social safety nets across the developed world have gotten
smaller, and spending on education and infrastructure has dwindled. If
governments generally oppose these things, should we really expect
them to be willing to include them in trade agreements? As I have
suggested here, tying public investment in economic development to
trade liberalization would give even fiscal conservatives who favor free
markets an incentive to support certain forms of public spending. If
politicians continue to argue in favor of greater trade liberalization
without supporting efforts to distribute the gains from such provisions,
then perhaps globalization's critics are correct.

149. Keynes, supra note 1, at 755.

